Dynamic, Meaningful Context

Redefining Derridean Différance

Dec 27, 2024

Author’s Note

My most recent transmission, One in a Hundred Thousand, included a subsection titled Redefining Derridean Différance. The piece has since been adapted into a supplemental essay with the goal of making différance more accessible via distillation. The outline is as follows:

Introduction
Differance/Supplement as Dynamic, Meaningful Context
On Dynamism
On Meaningfulness
On Context
Conclusion

Without further ado, I bring you: Dynamic, Meaningful Context: Redefining Derridean Différance.

Introduction

In his essay Différance, Jacques Derrida coined “différance” as a provisional name for “sameness which is not identical” (Derrida 586). The ‘a’ where an ‘e’ would be incorporates both aspects of the verb “to differ.” These aspects are difference (“distinction, inequality, or discernibility”) and deferral (“spacing and temporalizing that puts off until ‘later’ what is presently denied”) (586). With that ‘a’ differance encompasses both the “spacing/temporalizing” of differing and its being “movement that structures every dissociation” (586).1 Derrida argues that differance is not a “word” or “concept,” but rather the “origin or production of differences and the differences between differences, the play [jeu] of differences” (587).

Derrida’s explanation of differance can be convoluted and diffuse. This essay redefines differance—distilling the provisional name into three words: “dynamic, meaningful context.” Since differance eludes direct perception through sight and sound, defining it as “dynamic, meaningful context” provides clarity and concision (589). While differance is “immediately and irreducibly multivalent,” this new definition will be even more so, as it becomes more readily accessible through refinement (591).

Differance/Supplement as Dynamic, Meaningful Context

Julie Rivkin summarizes Derrida’s essay Différance as follows: “Derrida describes the process of spatial and temporal movement that he claims makes all thought and all reality possible” (585). The dynamic element lies in the ‘process,’ the ‘movement,’ and the ‘making.’ The meaningfulness resides in the ‘thought,’ in the significant aspects of ‘reality’ that are made possible. The context is the ‘network’ and ‘trace’ of similar differences within “networks of differences” (585). In a vacuum, absent dynamic, meaningful context, a factor—whether an “idea” or “unit of language,” for example—lacks “substance,” “identity,” and significance (585). Furthermore, differance is described as “the nonfull, nonsimple ‘origin’…the structured and differing origin of differences” (594). This is what dynamic, meaningful context is: the partial, complex origin of differences—and, perhaps, of all thought and reality.

To further substantiate that differance is “dynamic, meaningful context,” I reference Derrida’s assertion in That Dangerous Supplement: “supplement” is “another name for differance” (618).2 Derrida writes, “[t]he supplement supplements…adds only to replace” (613). A brief aside: this is why I prefer the term ‘supplementary’ over ‘counter’ in the “counter-canon,” as discussed by Pippa Marland in Ecocriticism (1773). The adding and replacing inherent in ‘supplementary’ is better for communication insofar as it imparts intent without carrying the implicit combativeness and negative connotations associated with ‘counter.’ Digression aside, Derrida also writes that “the supplement is an ‘exterior addition’” (614). Thus, dynamic, meaningful context is exterior—it adds to and replaces previous understandings of significance. This occurs within an economy (such as a text’s, for example) or network of differences, a concept Derrida addresses. When he refers to “the economy of a written text,” he speaks of the text’s relational dynamics with its meaningful context—such as influences or traces from other texts (618). He writes that this economy is “circulating through other texts, leading back to it [the given text] constantly, conforming to the element of a language and to its regulated functioning” (618). This circulation of meaning recontextualizes the text; in other words, this economic circulation is a part of dynamic, meaningful context—of differance/supplement, but I repeat myself. Derrida’s work demonstrates that differance/supplement must be defined as “dynamic, meaningful context.” To resolve any ambivalence or doubt, the following offers further corroboration that dynamism, meaningfulness, and context are independently necessary elements of differance/supplement—and, thus, integral to my definition.

On Dynamism

Regarding dynamism, references to deferring, play, and movement all highlight the dynamic nature of differance/supplement. First, as noted earlier in this section, the concept of deferral (“[putting] off until ‘later’”) is incorporated into differance by the ‘a’ where an ‘e’ would be (586). Derrida introduces the concept of the “play [jeu] of differences” on page 587, as previously mentioned, and revisits it on page 590. Play, particularly in the context of a game, occurs according to rules (even if those rules merely dictate engaging in activity for recreation rather than occupation) (“Play”) (“Jeu”). This both emphasizes the dynamic nature of differance/supplement and reinforces its role as the “structured and differing origin of differences” (594). The ‘differing’ is evident in the play, while the ‘structure’ is suggested by the rules that govern play. Dynamism is further present in the previously mentioned “movement” of differing (586). On movement, Derrida discusses the deferral that occurs with the “movement of signs,” stating that differance/supplement is “the movement of play that ‘produces’” differences and the effects of difference (592, 593–594). With these considerations, if differance/supplement were to be defined, one word would necessarily capture its “dynamic,” changing, fluid, energetic, and moving nature.

On Meaningfulness

Regarding meaningfulness, Derrida writes, “[s]igns represent the present in its absence” (591). Here, he refers to Saussurean signs; “[i]t was Saussure who first of all set forth the arbitrariness of signs and the differential character of signs” (592). As an example of what represents an absent present, and of that representation’s arbitrary and differential character, take a modern-day STOP sign. It needn’t necessarily be octagonal and red (although it is, and surely that counts for something). The arbitrariness lies in the fact that the STOP sign could just as easily have been a yellow triangle, a purple rhombus, or any other combination of color and shape. A diachronic endeavor might reveal precisely how the sign came to be octagonal and red (“everything that has to do with evolution is diachronic”), but I will leave that for another intrepid analyst (de Saussure, 220). Setting aside arbitrary characteristics, the STOP sign represents local traffic laws and an associated abstract injunction, like “depress the brake pedal until your vehicle’s forward movement ceases, or else.” Neither the law nor the admonishment are physically present; both are absent, represented by the sign. Similarly, the sign “beach” represents the absent sandy area that separates land and sea. “Beach” signifies not only the place (the beach itself) but also its qualitative associations—sand, tides, the border between land and sea, or perhaps between order and chaos, and so on. This is the significance, the meaning. What a sign means, signifies, or represents is the absent thing it points to. A definition of differance/supplement would thus require a term that denotes significance or meaning. Naturally, the “distinction” aspect of differance also points to the meaning element (since a thing is partially defined by what it is not) (586). This negative identification, which determines something by what it is not, suggests a collection of similar yet distinct things—in other words, context.

On Context

Incorporating “context” into my definition, the deferred meaning within distinctions implies a context made up of distinctions (reflecting the network of differences referenced earlier). Moreover, Derrida writes, “the employment of any code which implies a play of forms…also presupposes a retention and protention of differences…a play of traces” (597). Tautologically, the play of traces is differance/supplement, as the network of traces is characterized by that “sameness which is not identical” (586). However, it’s a bit more complex: Derrida writes, “differance is what makes the movement of signification possible only if each element that is said to be ‘present’…is related to something other than itself” (594–595). He calls this relation “trace,” stating that it “constitutes what is called the present” (595). To constitute the present “an interval must separate it [the present] from what it is not.” This interval, which constitutes itself (“dynamically dividing itself”) is the “spacing” that Derrida “propose[s] to call…differance” (595). The present is thus the result of an interval. This interval defines itself according to the trace of the past and the promise—not presence—of the future. It, much like a beach, is the border between order and chaos. This concept will be useful to remember in the penultimate section of this paper. Distinctions, intervals, and past and future influences (traces) make up context. Therefore, the definition of differance/supplement must include context, and thus must be “dynamic, meaningful context.”

Conclusion

Differance/supplement, that sameness which is not identical, has been redefined as dynamic, meaningful context. Condensing Derrida’s exposition into this three-word phrase, makes differance/supplement more accessible, functional, and significant. As this supplemental essay comes to a close, remember: things are seldom as simple as they seem—latent meaning lurks just beyond comprehension. Let there be analytical light.

Consider.

Works Cited

Derrida, Jacques. Literary Theory: An Anthology, edited by Rivkin, Julie, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2017, pp. 586–630. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ric-ebooks/detail.action?docID=7103984.

De Saussure, Ferdinand. Literary Theory: An Anthology, edited by Rivkin, Julie, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2017, p. 220. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ric-ebooks/detail.action?docID=7103984.

“Jeu.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/jeu.

Marland, Pippa. Literary Theory: An Anthology, edited by Rivkin, Julie, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2017, p. 1773. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ric-ebooks/detail.action?docID=7103984.

“Play.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/play.

Rivkin, Julie. Literary Theory: An Anthology, edited by Rivkin, Julie, John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, 2017, p. 585. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ric-ebooks/detail.action?docID=7103984.